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Introduction 
1 
Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus, three successor states of the former Soviet 
Union (FSU), started their transition to a democratic regime and market economy 
from the same initial point of the late stage of Gorbachev’s perestroika. The Soviet 
economy was at that time in complete macroeconomic chaos characterized by deep 
fiscal crisis, enormous market shortages (repressed inflation) and a severe balance of 
payments crisis. Government authorities both on all-Union and republican levels lost 
effective control over state-owned enterprise (SOE) behavior due to uncontrolled, 
spontaneous de facto decentralization of corporate governance. This was connected 
with the beginnings of spontaneous nomenklatura "privatization," which mainly 
consisted of non-legal transfers of profits and assets from the SOE to other persons. 
Additionally, the all-Union government lost control over the monetary and fiscal 
policies of the biggest republics, especially the Russian Federation. Interrepublican 
trade started to decline mainly as a result of huge shortages and the consequent 
autarchic policies of the republics
2 as well as the accelerating deterioration of the 
traditional payment mechanism. Of course, we must also remember the enormous 
structural distortions accumulated during more than 70 years of existence of the 
communist system. 
Thus, the three analyzed countries had to experience many similar problems and 
obstacles on their way to a market economy. The scale of initial economic and 
political difficulties in the FSU was far more substantial than in Central Europe (see 
Dąbrowski, 1995) or in Eastern Asia communist countries (see Sachs, 1995). This is 
perhaps one of the reasons why the results of economic and political transition in 
Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus have fallen far short of the results achieved by 
Central European countries. However, the experience of the Baltic countries - 
especially of Estonia (see, e.g., Bauc, 1995) - shows that even the difficult Soviet 
heritage can be overcome, yielding more successful reforms than those in the three big 
Slavic successors of the USSR.  
Generally, it would be very hard to state that Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus 
have been successful so far in the reform effort. The reasons for this situation will be 
analyzed in this paper.  
In spite of many similar problems experienced during the transition process, the 
three analyzed countries differ with respect to the direction and size of the external 
economic shock experienced after collapse of Soviet Union. Theoretically, Russia was 
able to achieve significant gains from stopping the delivery of energy resources and 
other raw materials to its neighbors at prices far below world levels and from stopping 
                                              
1 Paper prepared for the Russian Littoral Project Conference on: Economic Transition in the Newly 
Independent States: Prospects for Sustainable Development and Integration into the Global Economy, 
August 15-19, 1995 Odessa, Ukraine 
2 These autarchic tendencies were noticeable as well in inter-oblast’ trade within the biggest republics. 
Large cities such as Moscow, St. Petersburg, and Kiev, which were in a privileged position under the Soviet 
planning and distribution system became in 1990 and 1991 a subject of the spontaneous trade restrictions from 
the surrounding agricultural oblast’s. M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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explicit and implicit fiscal transfers. On the other hand, the Ukraine and Belarus 
suffered an enormous worsening of terms of trade with Russia. They also started to 
have problems with demand for many of their manufactured products oriented earlier 
mainly towards the Russian market and military purposes. However, the three 
analyzed countries also differed with respect to adopted transition strategies, including 
timing and sequencing of reform steps.  
At the very end of 1991, Russia began to attempt to implement an ambitious 
transition package modelled to some extent on Poland’s experience. Unfortunately, 
political obstacles, the conceptual weakness of the initial reform scenario, and the lack 
of sufficient consistency in its implementation (see Dąbrowski and Rostowski, 1995) 
led to at least partial failure of this effort. However, Russia has, during the last three 
years, made substantial progress toward a market economy, especially with respect to 
ownership transformation.  
The Ukraine and Belarus did not want to follow Russia’s reform example in 
1992 and 1993. Neither privatization nor serious institutional reforms were started at 
that time in either country. Although in the beginning of 1992 they had to follow to 
some extent the Russian price liberalization (because of the common currency and 
trade area), they tried to change as little as possible in this sphere. In 1991-1993 the 
Ukraine conducted a very populist macroeconomic policy, which brought the country 
to the verge of hyperinflation by the end of 1993 (Dąbrowski, 1994; Havrylyshyn, 
Miller, and Perraudin, 1994). However, after the June-July 1994 presidential election, 
newly-elected President Leonid Kuchma initiated a big political effort to implement a 
comprehensive package of economic reforms and regain lost time. The final result of 
this effort is still unclear as of June 1995.  
In contrast to the Ukraine, Belarus followed a quite responsible fiscal policy 
until mid-1993 and tried to maintain traditional communist control and discipline in 
the economy. This policy collapsed in the second half of 1993, when Russia adjusted 
energy prices and terminated the flow of so-called technical credits from its central 
bank. Additionally, the presidential election campaign and the failure of the idea of 
monetary union with Russia strengthened inflationary pressure. Since the end of 1993 
Belarus has balanced on the verge of hyperinflation and has had political problems 
with implementing a consistent reform package.  
The authors of this paper try to analyze the similarities and differences in the 
starting conditions, adopted policies, and achieved results of the above three 
countries. The first part of the paper will be devoted to the initial conditions: the 
economic heritage of the FSU (especially of the perestroika years), differences in the 
economic structures of the discussed countries, and the level of their mutual 
interdependence. The second part contains a comparative analysis of the 
liberalization, stabilization, and privatization processes in each country. The third part 
presents the differences in macroeconomic performance and the progress of the 
transition. In the final part we try to analyze the political and other reasons for the 
observed differences.  Economic Transition in ... 
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Part I: Initial Conditions 
1. The common heritage: the collapse of the Soviet 
economy 
All the transition countries in the Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) and the 
FSU inherited from the communist period a series of serious economic problems. 
Four of the most important reasons are the following: 
1.  Total or almost total nationalization of the economy left a very limited role for private saving 
and implied either explicit prohibition of or serious restrictions on private economic activity. 
Making matters worse, the official systems of education and propaganda in all communist 
countries tried to convince people of the superiority of state over private ownership.  
2.  Huge structural distortions existed, resulting from monopolization, economic autarchy, 
administrative price regulation, and centralized investment decisions. The communist 
economies were strongly oriented to domestic and regional markets (the latter through the 
Council for Mutual Economic Assistance - CMEA) and were more or less separated from 
other markets by currency inconvertibility, price controls, trade restrictions, and the state 
monopoly in foreign trade. 
3.  The burden of social spending was very large relative to the level of economic development 
(see Sachs, 1995). This part of the communist heritage is a relatively new one. The first 
decades of communist regime were characterized by rather austere policy in this respect. This 
situation started to change some time after the death of Iosif Stalin, with the growth of social 
and political unrest (disturbances in the GDR in 1953, Poland in 1956 and 1970, Hungary in 
1956, Czechoslovakia in 1968). Less repressive (in comparison with the Stalinist period) 
mutations of the communist regimes were looking for some form of social support and 
legitimization.  
4.  Domestic and external macroeconomic disequilibrium prevailed and was especially strong in 
the last years of the communist regimes, during which they lost their capacity to control 
economic and social life. Partly, this was a result of factors described in points 2 and 3. Only 
Czechoslovakia, Hungary, and the GDR avoided dramatic macroeconomic crises, but even in 
these countries (and especially in Hungary) the degree of macroeconomic stability was far 
from Western standards. Domestic disequilibrium manifested itself in the form of a rising 
budget deficit and monetary expansion, difficulties in controlling wages, and other serious 
problems, leading to high inflation either in repressed (a "shortage economy," to use Jŕnos 
Kornai’s terminology) or in open form. The external imbalances usually led to growing 
foreign debt. 
This list shows the differences of CEE and FSU transitions from the transitions 
of communist countries in East or Southeast Asia such as China, Vietnam or Laos. 
The latter inherited fewer structural distortions, mainly because they were far less 
industrialized than the FSU or CEE (see Sachs and Woo, 1994). China maintained 
private family farms in agriculture (except for a short experiment with communes) 
whereas the Soviet Union and CEE (with the exceptions of Poland and Yugoslavia) 
relied mainly on state and collective farms. Asian communist countries offered their 
populations far less social support than the FSU and CEE (Sachs, 1995). Finally, they 
succeeded in maintaining relative macroeconomic discipline. 
The above list also gives us an understanding of the differences between CEE 
and FSU countries. The latter (except for the Baltic states, Moldova, and western parts M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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of Belarus and the Ukraine) had a longer communist record and a longer break with 
capitalism, which in Tsarist Russia had only been in the initial stage of development. 
Communist dictatorship was generally more repressive and state dominance over 
economic and social life more severe. Anti-market and etatistic indoctrination lasted 
more than 70 years in the Soviet Union, whereas in CEE and the Baltics they lasted 
only some 45 years. A greater number of decades of communist industrialization 
policy, a higher degree of economic autarchy (because of the size of the country), a 
higher level of militarization, and almost unlimited availability of cheap energy and 
other natural resources: all these factors contributed to greater structural distortion of 
the FSU economies than of CEE countries.  
The USSR never was a leader of macroeconomic stability among the communist 
countries. However, the last years of perestroika brought the situation in this area to a 
critical point.  
For example, the average annual rate of growth of M2 in 1981-5 amounted to 
7.5% (IMF et al., 1990, p. 49), which was already excessive taking into consideration 
the smaller GDP rate of growth and total price control. In the second half of the 
1980s, the monetary expansion accelerated further. The M2 annual rate of growth was 
8.5% in 1986, 14.7% in 1987, 14.1% in 1988, 14.8% in 1989, and 15.3% in 1990 
(IMF at al., 1990, p. 49). The rising fiscal deficit was a main factor in this monetary 
expansion. According to the same estimates it amounted to 2.4% of GDP in 1985, 
6.2% in 1986, 8.4% in 1987, 9.2% in 1988, and 8.5% in 1989 (IMF et al., 1990, p. 
10). Moreover, the partial liberalization of the SOE financial system (i.e., allowing 
SOEs more flexibility in the use of their financial assets) increased money velocity.  
The second half of the 1980s was also a period of significant deterioration of 
external balances. The current account balance in convertible currencies, positive until 
1988 (+US$ 2.3 billion in 1986, +US$ 6.7 billion in 1987, and +US$ 1.6 billion in 
1988), radically deteriorated in 1989 (-US$ 3.8 billion) and in 1990 (-US$ 10.7 
billion) (IMF et al., 1990, p. 10). Consequently, the external debt rose from US$ 28.9 
billion in 1985 to US$ 54.0 billion in 1989. These developments were connected both 
with the growing level of domestic macroeconomic disequilibrium (budget deficit and 
monetary expansion) and with the sharply deteriorating terms of trade, especially in 
the oil market (IMF et al., 1990, p. 50). Declining oil export revenues and profitability 
also contributed to fiscal difficulties (oil export was previously a significant source of 
budget revenues).  
The level of the above-mentioned repressed inflation further increased due to 
monetary expansion, decreasing demand for money, and the remaining price controls. 
Until the beginning of 1991, growth of the official consumer price index was not high. 
CPI growth in the state-owned retail trade amounted to 2.4% in 1989 and 5.2% in 
1990. The retail price increase in the so-called co-operative trade
3 was 0.5% in 1989 
and 5.2% in 1990. The same indicators for the kolkhoz market were 7.4% in 1989 and 
34.3% in 1990 (IMF, 1992, table 11).  
                                              
3 Shops formally owned by trade cooperatives with prices controlled by the state, however far more 
flexible than typical administered prices and usually without subsidies.  Economic Transition in ... 
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These figures indirectly illustrate the increasing level of repressed inflation and 
forced savings. Carlo Cottarelli and Mario I. Blejer assessed that "... at the end of 
1990 the amount of wealth accumulated in monetary form by Soviet households as a 
result of forced savings was around 170-190 billion rubles, close to 20 percent of 
GDP and around one third of the existing financial assets" (Cottarelli and Blejer, 
1991). It can be added that monetary overhang was equal to two thirds of private 
consumption.  
From April 1, 1991, in connection with the price reform implemented by the 
Valentin Pavlov government,
4 inflation started to take on a more open form. Two 
estimates of CPI growth in the state retail trade in 1991 are, respectively, 89.5% 
(calculated from the average level of 1991 and the average level of 1990) and 146.1% 
(December 1991 to December 1990). Respectively, consolidated CPI growth 
amounted to 90.4% and 152.1%, and growth of the price index of the kolkhoz market 
to 132.1% and 281.2% (IMF, 1992, table 11). Inflation had a mixed character in the 
second half of 1991, partly in the form of open price increases, partly in the form of 
rising market shortages.  
The rising budget deficit, financed exclusively by credit from the State Bank 
(Gosbank) of the USSR and also by republican central banks was a main cause of the 
high inflation in 1991. According to IMF estimates the total budget deficit of the 
Russian Federation in 1991 (including the consequences of assuming responsibility 
for the entire budget of the former USSR) reached a level of 31% of GDP (IMF, 1992, 
p. 12). The Ukrainian general government deficit amounted in the same year to 13.7% 
of GDP (IMF, 1993a, table 23). That year Belarus achieved a surplus of 2% of GDP 
(also related to general government operations) (IMF, 1993b, table 24).  
Rising state subsidies to support administratively controlled prices, the decrease 
in output, and weak tax discipline can be seen as sources of this huge fiscal deficit. 
Some republics (mainly the Russian Federation) started in late 1990 and 1991 a 
populist competition with the all-union government to see who would provide more 
social protection and propose lower taxes to SOEs.
5 At the same time a real 
decomposition of the ruble area started to take place. Gosbank of the USSR lost 
control over the credit emission of some republican central banks, again mainly over 
the Central Bank of the Russian Federation (CBRF), created by the Russian 
parliament at the end of 1990.  
                                              
4 This was, in principle, a typical administrative price reform. However, it included liberalization 
components, especially in the producer goods sphere. In the following months, effective price control weakened 
due to the political decomposition of the all-union government. 
5 The tax war had two aspects. Lower tax rates offered by the parliament and government of the Russian 
Federation were intended to stimulate SOEs to change their place in the administrative hierarchy, switching 
from subordination to the Union to subordination to the republic. At the same time Russian authorities began to 
seize tax revenues from SOEs on their territory and stop transferring them to the all-union budget. Both 
practices (especially the second one) were soon taken up by other republics (with a certain time lag). M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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The weakening of financial discipline manifested itself on the micro level 
through the fast growth of nominal and "real" wages
6 in the second half of 1991. In 
the last quarter to 1991 "real" wages in industry were 33% higher than their average 
level in 1990 (IMF, 1992, p. 11). This also contributed to the significant decrease in 
the real profits of enterprises.  
In the years of perestroika, economic growth in the USSR and the Russian 
Federation was lower than in the preceding decades and gradually decreased. The net 
material product (NMP) of Russia increased only by 2.4% in 1986, 0.7% in 1987, 
4.5% in 1988 and 1.9% in 1989. Beginning in 1990 NMP started to decrease, by 3.6% 
in 1990 and 11.0% in 1991 (preliminary estimates) (IMF, 1992, table 4). At the same 
time the index of gross industrial output amounted to +4.5% in 1986, +3.5% in 1987, 
+3.8% in 1988, +1.4% in 1989, -0.1% in 1990, and -8.0% in 1991 (IMF, 1992, table 
5).  
The main reasons for the 1990-1991 recession were the crisis of the central 
planning system, the motivation crisis in SOEs, the disintegration of trade relations 
between East European countries after the collapse of CMEA, and the gradual 
weakening of trade links between Soviet republics.  
Thus, the economic heritage of the USSR was extremely difficult. All newly 
independent states (NIS) at the beginning of 1992 faced the necessity of achieving 
monetary stabilization and price liberalization and starting the process of market 
oriented institutional and ownership reforms.  
2. Structural distortions, mutual interdependence, and 
initial differences 
Economic relations among FSU countries have been characterized by three main 
issues: (i) chronic deficits of non-Russian republics in trade with Russia, (ii) a poorly 
functioning payments mechanism and (iii) a lack of stable monetary arrangements (in 
1992). 
2.1. Balance of payments deficits 
The Soviet Union was composed of 15 republics, which were very differentiated 
with respect to human, physical, and natural resources. Political integration within the 
USSR required vertical fiscal redistribution between the Union budget and the 
republican budgets. Russia provided a net resource flow to most USSR republics. 
Until the dissolution of the Soviet Union in 1991, two channels of financial transfers 
were used: (i) direct transfers from the budget of Russian Federation and (ii) (what 
was more important and harder to estimate) implicit trade subsidies. In inter-
republican trade, prices for goods were set by the central authorities, independently of 
the market mechanism. If the prices of tradable goods and services differed from the 
                                              
6 We use the word "real" in quotation marks to indicate its purely formal, statistical sense. In reality, the 
increase of "real" wages is not comparable with such growth in market economies, as it is accompanied in the 
Russian case by increasing market shortages. Economic Transition in ... 
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world level, then importers of overpriced goods subsidized exporting republics, just as 
the exporters of underpriced goods subsidized importing republics. 
Table 1: Average world market to domestic market price ratios (over all republics and 
weighted by trade volumes of individual republics) in inter-republican trade by major 
commodity groups in the year 1990 
Sector Ratio  Sector  Ratio 
Oil and gas  2.70 Construction materials  0.97 
Electric energy  1.50 Light industry  0.33 
Coal 0.94 Food  industry  0.38 
Other energy  0.71 Other industrial branches  0.63 
Ferrous metals  1.18 Agricultural products  0.63 
Non-ferrous metals  1.66   (unprocessed)  0.45 
Chemicals 0.83 Communication,  transport  1.11 
Machine building  1.11   and services   
Wood and paper 
products 
0.72 Total trade  0.97 
Source:  Lucjan T. Orlowski, Indirect Transfers in Trade... in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6, 1993, 
 1001-1024. 
A crude assessment
7 of indirect transfers was made by the Central Statistical 
Office of the USSR (Goskomstat) for 1987-90 intra-Union trade in fifteen sectors (see 
Orlowski, 1993). The task of this exercise was to show to what extent inter-republican 
trade could have changed if, instead of domestic prices, "world market" prices had 
been applied (see table 1). The ratios demonstrate strongly underpriced trade in oil 
and gas, where the world market price was 2.7 times higher than the domestic price, 
and overpriced trade in light and food industry (thus, world prices were 33% of 
domestic prices). 
The energy resources sector had a dominant position in these implicit transfers, 
taking into consideration its weight in total intra-Union trade. In 1990 the oil and gas 
sector accounted for almost 62% of total transfers through underpriced exports (see 
table 2). 
Summing up, the Goskomstat data reveal that negative transfers exceeded 
positive ones by about 17% (see table 2). Energy-intensive industries were the main 
beneficiaries of implicit trade subsidies, and Soviet consumers were those who mainly 
paid for it. 
Indirect transfers were unequally distributed among the republics of the USSR. 
Transfers were made by the republics which exported underpriced oil and natural gas 
                                              
7 This whole approach is highly questionable for differentiated goods, particularly capital and 
intermediary ones. It is very difficult, or even impossible, to compare Soviet industrial products, such as cars, 
machines, etc. with those sold on world markets and, therefore, to assess the level of comparable world market 
prices for Soviet products. This is why the results are more useful for natural resources and, to some extent, for 
homogeneous primary commodities (agricultural goods, food products, energy). M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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and received imported underpriced goods. On the other side, transfers were received 
by republics which imported underpriced oil and natural gas and exported overpriced 
goods. Republics rich in oil and natural gas deposits were net creditors of other 
republics importing underpriced resources. These republics were mostly Russia, 
Turkmenia, and, to some degree, Azerbaijan. In addition, predominantly Russia and to 
a lesser extent the Ukraine, Uzbekistan, Kirghizia, and Kazakhstan made transfers 
through importing overpriced non-oil and gas products. Looking at the data in table 3, 
comparing the share of transfers in GDP of particular republics we can see that only 
Russia and Turkmenia were net donors. 
Table 2: Indirect transfers in inter-republican trade for all FSU republics, by major 
commodity groups in 1990 (in millions of current rubles) 
  Indirect transfers through 
Sectors Subsidized 
exports 
% of total  Overpriced 
import 
% of total 
Oil and gas  22 552 61.5 -   
Electric energy  966 2.6 -  - 
Coal - - 70  0.2 
Other energy  - - 4  0.0 
Ferrous metals  2 462 6.7 -  - 
Non-ferrous metals  3 878 10.6 -  - 
Chemicals - - 3  216  7.5 
Machine building  6 333 17.3 -  - 
Wood and paper products  - - 1 432  3.3 
Construction materials  - - 78  0.2 
Light industry  - - 19 203  44.8 
Food industry  - - 13 372  31.2 
Other industrial branches  - - 2 017  4.7 
Agricultural products 
(unprocessed) 
- - 3 489  8.1 
Communication, transport  474 1.3 -  - 
Sum of transfers  36 665 100.0 42 881  100.0 
Source:  Lucjan T. Orlowski, Indirect Transfers in Trade... in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6, 
 1993,  1001-1024. 
Summing up the source and direction of indirect transfers, the Soviet republics 
can be presented in four well-known boxes (Table 4). It shows that Russia was the 
only republic that made net transfers through underpriced export of oil and natural gas 
and overpriced import of other goods. Belarus is among eight small and mostly 
underdeveloped republics which were double recipients (through underpriced import 
and overpriced export). Finally, the Ukraine belonged to the republics which were 
subsidized through underpriced import of oil and natural gas and on the other hand 
acted as donors importing overpriced goods. The Ukraine was the biggest recipient of 
indirect transfers of energy resources from Russia in that group. Economic Transition in ... 
  - 11 -  CASE Foundation 
Table 3: Regional structure of indirect transfers in 1990 (in millions of current rubels) 





exports of oil 
and gas 
Overpriced 









oil and gas 
Net transfer 
as % of GDP 
Russia  15 811  13 867  4 071  3 166 3.67 
Ukraine  430  3 500  2 780  6 979 -3.61 
Belorussia  1 564  1 281  2 745  3 699 -8.91 
Uzbekistan  833  2 274  2 113  1 403 -1.26 
Kazakhstan  1 672  1 748  1 666  1 984 -0.50 
Georgia 5  917  2  877  432 -16.02 
Azerbaijan 936  845  2  465  906 -10.09 
Lithuania  285  333  1 479  1 480 -17.09 
Moldavia 0  577  3  148  -532 -24.05 
Latvia 7  397  1  096  559 -10.43 
Kirghizja 24  605  516  336 -2.72 
Tadzhikistan 22  617  756  339 -6.08 
Armenia 0  910  1  439  350 -9.16 
Turkmenia 963  583  659  98 10.81 
Estonia 0  329  948  287 -12.08 
Source:  Lucjan T. Orlowski, Indirect Transfers in Trade... in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6, 1993, 
 1001-1024. 
Table 4: Donors and recipients in interrepublican trade in 1990 
    Underpriced trade in oil and gas 
    Donors (Exporters)  Recipients (Importers) 
Overpriced trade 




















Source:  Lucjan T. Orlowski, Indirect Transfers in Trade... in Europe-Asia Studies, Vol. 45, No. 6, 1993, 
 1001-1024. 
As a result of price adjustment in inter-republican trade, Russia gains the most 
due to underpriced exports of oil and natural gas. Belarus has been in the position to 
face the biggest lost, because of overpriced exports of chemicals, light and machine M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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industry (high energy consumption). Net exporters of agricultural production, like 
Ukraine can be negatively effected through opening markets for a foreign competition 
which has forced to lower prices in the trade among FSU countries. 
The changes in relative prices caused a significant adjustment in the energy-
importing FSU countries. Import volumes declined in a number of former republics, 
which was one of the main reasons for large output (and GDP) decline in FSU 
countries (see section III.3).
8 However, the terms of trade shock was partially softened 
by financial transfers extended by Russia (see section II.2.). Most of this financing 
was provided by the CBRF through its correspondent accounts with other central 
banks and through technical credits negotiated on a bilateral basis (see table 5). 
Additionally, Russian enterprises financed enterprises in the other states of the FSU 
through the buildup of inter-enterprise arrears (equivalent to about 1% of Russia’s 
GDP in 1992) (IMF, 1994).  
Table 5: Financing of Other States by the Central Bank of the Russian Federation in 1992 
Item  End of 1992 CBRF correspondent account position 
Country  In billions of current rubles  In % of GDP 
Russia -2,109  -11.7 
Armenia 34  49.0 
Azerbaijan 51  25.8 
Belarus 102  10.7 
Estonia 4  4.0 
Georgia 69  51.5 
Kazakhstan 407  25.5 
Kyrgyzstan 42  22.9 
Latvia 2  1.0 
Lithuania 9  3.2 
Moldova 27  11.3 
Tajikistan 36  90.7 
Turkmenistan 172  53.3 
Ukraine 862  21.7 
Uzbekistan 292  69.9 
Source: Russian authorities and IMF data 
The financing received from Russia by some countries of the FSU amounted to 
one third or even more of their GDP (Table 5). Also, some portion of cash emission 
(about 3% of Russian GDP in 1992) could be considered as financing, since the 
                                              
8 Deliveries of crude oil and oil products by Russia to other states of the FSU dropped by about 43% 
between 1990 and 1992. The decline resulted from falling oil production in Russia, an increase in the share of 
exports to countries outside the FSU and lower demand in the states of former USSR due to a deterioration in 
the terms of trade. Economic Transition in ... 
  - 13 -  CASE Foundation 
Russian cash rubles were used by enterprises and individuals from the other states to 
import goods from Russia. 
2.2. Payment mechanism 
The payments system in the USSR was not base on market discipline, as it was 
characterized by soft budget constraints. The whole system was slow and did not 
allow for establishing the balance on customers’ (republics) accounts before payment 
was processed completely. This ineffective system did provide the financing of 
imbalances between states of the former Soviet Union. The majority of FSU countries 
(net debtors) were and still are not interested in improving and sufficiently adjusting 
the payments and settlements system, and this is also the main reason why many 
attempts to resolve this problem made during meetings of the Commonwealth of 
Independent States
9 (CIS) have been finally abandoned. On the other hand, Russian 
politicians who are against any further deterioration of cooperation among countries 
of the former USSR could attract the "supporters" of closer relations with Russia only 
by offering economic support. 
After the dissolution of the USSR, Russia began to use the settlements system as 
an instrument for monitoring its interstate payments imbalances. The economic 
reforms started in Russia in the end of 1991, did not allow for continued financing of 
the FSU states on the previous scale. Aiming to impose better monetary control and 
stop automatic transfer of credit rubles from other CIS states to Russia, a set of 
bilateral central bank correspondent accounts were created through which payments 
were not to be processed without funding. However, in mid-1992, the financing of 
shortfalls in other states generated rapidly growing overdrafts, which forced the 
CBRF to establish limits on payments imbalances (so-called technical credits). This 
form of short-term financing was intended to avert the collapse of interstate trade. 
Technical credits were supposed to be repaid by FSU countries through deliveries of 
goods. The growing amount of technical credits convinced the Russian government 
and Supreme Soviet to halt further financing and convert technical credits given in 
1992 and 1993 into the official debt of FSU countries. During the spring and summer 
of 1993 Russia, and debtor countries (including Belarus and Ukraine) started to sign 
debt repayment agreements.   
2.3. Monetary arrangements 
Many FSU countries postponed the decision whether to remain in the ruble area 
or to introduce their own national currencies for quite a long time. The expectation of 
greater financial support from Russia in the form of subsidized energy import was the 
main reason for this delay. However, remaining in the ruble area for a longer period of 
time also had its price. The highest one was connected with the postponement of trade 
adjustment and macroeconomic stabilization. The longer the period of 
macroeconomic chaos lasted, the harder would be the measures necessary to stabilize 
the economy. 
                                              
9 The CIS consists of twelve of the fifteen republics of the FSU (the missing three are the Baltic ones). M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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Despite various attempts discussed during CIS summits, a common monetary 
and fiscal policy was never effectively adopted. Very expansive credit policies of 
individual central banks in 1992 and 1993 (which constituted the main method of 
financing trade imbalances between FSU states) resulted in inflation "competition" 
and finally led to the complete decomposition of the common currency area (see 
Dąbrowski and Antczak, forthcoming). The exchange of the cash rubles in July 1993 
(withdrawal of pre-1993 ruble banknotes from circulation in Russia) was the final step 
towards the establishment of national currencies
10 by all the FSU countries.
11 
However, some FSU states persisted for quite a long time in their belief in the 
possibility of rebuilding the ruble area as a viable monetary union, in spite of the 
obvious unwillingness to accept Russia’s conditions for such a union. (These 
conditions were intended to protect the Russian stabilization effort started in 1992). 
Belarus belonged to the group trying at the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994 to 
realize the idea of monetary union with Russia. An agreement on such a union was 
even signed in April 1994 but never really implemented.  
The Ukraine was one of the first newly independent countries to leave the ruble 
area, doing so in November 1992, just after the Baltic states. Unfortunately, this 
decision did not help to start a real stabilization policy, and Ukrainian karbovanets 
collapsed very quickly (see below). In contrast to Baltic countries, the Ukraine left the 
ruble area because it held the monetary policy of the CBRF to be too restrictive.  
                                              
10 It is widely held that monetary "reform" of July-August 1993 was intended to fully isolate Russia from 
the influences of credit and cash policies of other central banks in the region. The second probable explanation 
is that this radical step was taken in order to convince the central banks of the FSU countries to accept the 
CBRF’s conditions for the creation of the so-called the Ruble Zone of the New Type. 
11 Tadzhikistan was the last one to do so, in 1995. Economic Transition in ... 
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Part II: Transition Policies 
1. Domestic and external liberalization 
1.1. Domestic liberalization in Russia 
The first attempt, at least in theory, to liberalize prices in former USSR was 
included in the 500 day program in 1990.
12 The first democratic government, formed 
at the end of 1991 with Deputy Prime Minister Egor Gaidar, considered the freeing of 
prices from administrative controls as a precondition for reforms. In November and 
December 1991 a package of legislative acts significantly diminishing state control of 
prices was prepared (see Dąbrowski et al., 1993). 
The first, fundamental step in internal liberalization was taken on January 2, 
1992. The operation was, however, not completed. Because of pressure from various 
lobbies, price controls stayed in force with regard to a wide range of consumer goods 
(bread, milk, cottage cheese, baby formulas, sugar, salt, margarine, matches, alcohol, 
petrol, etc.) and some industrial inputs (coal, crude oil, electric energy, all freight 
charges). Maximum retail margins (of 30%) were imposed as well as administrative 
controls of prices set by monopolies. The result was that goods sold at regulated 
prices remained subject to shortages.  
The next stage of liberalization was carried out at the beginning of March, when 
some of the prices still controlled by the state were liberalized and some 
administrative pricing decisions were moved from central to local levels. The latter 
affected the prices of consumer goods (bread, milk, etc.) and local transportation 
charges. In effect some prices were liberalized and some stayed under control. 
The third stage of deregulation of prices was initiated by the decree of the 
President of Russian Federation "On state controls of the prices of some energy 
sources," which abolished the ceilings on the prices of oil and natural gas as of 
September 18, 1992. However, the domestic oil and gas prices and the prices charged 
in exports to FSU countries were below world prices (see below). 
The new Prime Minister, Victor Chernomyrdin, tried to return to price controls 
shortly after taking office. A decree issued on December 31, 1992, called for the 
introduction of percentage ceilings on the rate of return for many producers of goods 
classified as essentials (from 10% to 50%). Protests by members of the government, 
including Deputy Prime Ministers Boris Fedorov and Anatolii Chubais, resulted in a 
new decree issued on January 18, 1993, abolishing the limits on profit levels for non-
monopolistic producers and reducing the number of monopolistic producers whose 
independence in price setting was restricted. 
Finally, in June 1993 coal prices were liberalized and an important part of 
budget subsidies cut. The same was done for the prices of bread in October 1993.  At 
                                              
12 In this program, liberalization of prices was left until a later stage of the reform, after mass 
privatization and financial stabilization. M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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the end of 1993 all margins imposed on the prices of monopolistic enterprises were 
abolished. 
1.2. Domestic liberalization in Belarus 
A fundamental price reform, modelled on the Russian example, was introduced 
in the end of 1991 and beginning of 1992. The wholesale prices for the bulk of goods 
and services were freed from administrative control, but limits on the level of profits 
of monopolistic producers and in the trade sector were applied.
13 Maximum profit 
margins amounted to 20% of costs in the state sector and 30% in the private sector. In 
1993 these limits affected about one third of industrial goods. Most administratively 
controlled prices (directly fixed by the government) were changing during 1992 and 
1993, but the pace of growth was slower than the inflation level; furthermore, prices 
for consumer goods were "frozen" after first wave of liberalization at the beginning of 
1992. The best example of the results of (administrative) control of prices, which were 
kept below the market prices, was the level of 5% to 20% coverage costs for prices of 
consumer goods and transportation charges during 1992-93. The remainder of the 
prices was covered by budget subsidies.  
In 1994, the state still controlled about 5-7% of all retail prices of "essential" 
goods (bread, milk, etc.). The new president, Alexander Lukashenko, beginning his 
term in office, made some attempts to reverse the process of liberalization. An 
example was the decree of December of 1994, lowering the liberalized prices of 
consumer goods. This decree caused serious shortages of foodstuffs in January 1995.  
However, the liberalization process has not been halted. In July 1994 prices for 
consumer goods were administratively raised to eliminate part of subsidies. The 
government decree of October affirmed this move and liberalized wholesale prices of 
foodstuffs. Prices of natural gas and electric energy for industry and the agricultural 
sector were also deregulated, and as of October 1994 prices for oil and gas fully 
covered the costs of import. The next decree, issued in November, abolished the limits 
imposed on profit margins in wholesale and retail trade. In addition, the list of 266 
monopolistic enterprises was shortened to 71 enterprises in January 1995.  
In 1991, state orders (goszakazy - compulsory deliveries for state needs
14) 
comprised 64% of national production. In 1993, the share of such orders fell to 40% 
of industrial production and in 1994 to 19% (Macroeconomic Survey of Belarus, 
1994). The total amount of goods subject to state orders was cut from a few thousand 
in the years of the command economy to less than 300 in 1992 and about 30 in 1993. 
The real level of state orders is difficult to assess, because state supplies are negotiated 
between the ministries supplying goods and services and the ministries receiving 
them. 
                                              
13 In addition, in spite of the liberalization of wholesale prices for agricultural products, the Ministry of 
Agriculture still set minimal prices and agricultural goods are subsidized in many ways (through sales of 
underpriced inputs, purchases of overpriced outputs, or the extension of bank credits with negative interest 
rates).   
14 State needs consist of international agreements, military reserves, goods needed in the Chernobyl 
clean-up, etc. Economic Transition in ... 
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1.3. Domestic liberalization in the Ukraine 
In early January 1992, the Ukrainian government introduced a partial 
liberalization of prices, accompanied, however, by significant increases in the levels 
of administered and regulated prices. The latter increases included, at the producer 
level, prices of coal, crude oil, natural gas, and electricity, and at the retail level, 
gasoline, diesel oil, coal, gas, electricity, municipal services, and rents. Pressure from 
the parliament and trade unions resulted in the roll-back of certain increases and a 
broadening of the scope of price regulation in comparison with initial intentions. On 
January 31, limits of 25-40% on profitability margins for most goods whose prices 
had already been deregulated were implemented by presidential decree. Administered 
prices continued to apply to a number of goods and services. At the producer level, 
these prices covered coal, crude oil, gas, electricity, freight transport and 
communication. At the retail level they covered most basic foodstuffs, household 
fuels, electricity, rents, municipal services and communication.  
Agricultural prices were, at least in principle, liberalized in early 1992. In 
practice maximum procurement prices continued to apply, which made the state the 
only purchaser of agricultural produce. Various administrative price adjustments were 
made in March and April (increases in the prices of coal, electricity, transport, and 
municipal services). In May, retail subsidies for gasoline and diesel oil were 
abolished. In June, formal subsidies of dairy products at production level were cut; 
however, subsidies for milk production were still paid to producers. In July, the 
majority of limits on profit margins were abolished, except for those on especially 
sensitive goods. In August, the administered prices of domestic crude oil and natural 
gas were increased significantly. 
The second comprehensive price adjustment was implemented in late December 
1992 by decree, under the emergency economic powers granted to the government. 
First, there were significant increases in the levels of administered prices. Second, 
administered prices for transport charges and oil products at the retail level were 
abolished. In all these cases administered prices were switched to the regulatory 
category. Finally, a scheme for the indexation of agricultural procurement prices was 
introduced for 1993, with indicative prices for deliveries under state orders of a 
number of products being indexed to the price of agricultural inputs (Święcicki and 
Wellisz, 1993). 
During the first months of 1993, administered prices remained unchanged. In 
May the government raised substantially most controlled producer prices. Retail 
prices were also to be raised, but Parliament imposed a moratorium on retail price 
increases. In early June, it was lifted and the adjustment of retail prices went into 
effect. Until the end of 1994 no other serious liberalization of prices was made. Only 
after signing the Systemic Transformation Facility (STF) agreement with the IMF in 
October 1994 did price liberalization begin on a more serious basis. However, in June 
1995 some forms of direct (bread and flour prices on the regional level) and indirect 
(so-called "enterprise-monopolists" and trade margins for basic products) forms of 
price control were still retained.  
During 1992 state orders (goszakazy) covered about 1200 (!) broadly defined 
categories of goods (75% of turnover in those goods) (IMF, 1993a). The system M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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began to change at the end of 1992. The main reason was the break-up of retail 
monopolies. A government decree issued on January 22, 1993 reduced the size of 
orders to 600 groups (50% of turnover). The new system made a distinction between 
state orders and state contracts (procurement for the government’s own consumption 
needs). During 1994 the lack of budgetary funds prevented the government not only 
from paying for state orders but also from fulfilling state contracts. In the 1995 
budget, no financial resources were provided for goszakazy. 
1.4. External liberalization in Russia 
The first changes were introduced by the presidential decree "On the 
liberalization of foreign economic activity in the territory of RSFSR" on November 
15, 1992. All enterprises were allowed to purchase foreign currencies, either through 
foreign exchange auctions or directly from other enterprises. (The system of 
centralized foreign exchange distribution was not cancelled.) The decree also 
provided for free access of Russian citizens to foreign exchange offices. 
The decree did not deregulate the most important area in external relations, 
export controls. Export quotas for 17 broad categories of goods (oil and oil products, 
coal, natural gas, chemical products, timber, pulp and paper, pig iron, non-ferrous 
metals and products, fertilizers, textiles, medicines, fish, etc.) were maintained. These 
categories represented about 66% of total export in 1992 (IMF, 1993a). Also, the 
system of export licences for other than "special" goods (weapons, radioactive 
materials, precious metals and stones, etc.) did not change significantly and reflected 
fears of shortages in the market.  
Partial liberalization retained the multiple exchange rates of the ruble; e.g., the 
money market rate, the free-market tourist rate, so called quasi-commercial rate 
(applied to centralized imports and the mandatory sale of 10% of export revenues in 
foreign exchange to the CBRF), the special commercial rate (half of the previous one, 
applied to the mandatory sale of the next 40% of export revenues) and, finally, the so-
called official rate (highly overvalued) for settlements of some loans and official 
transfers. 
The export barriers and the segmentation of the foreign exchange market (the 
cash operation market was fully separated from trade operations) resulted in a weak 
supply of foreign exchange. The administrative and financial barriers made exporters 
reluctant to repatriate their profits from abroad, artificially appreciated the ruble 
exchange rate applied to compulsory sale of export earnings, and caused speculation 
on the devaluation of the ruble. All this led to the devaluation of the ruble and 
unjustifiably high exchange rates of foreign currencies on the foreign exchange 
market. 
The system of administrative measures to control export was not very effective, 
because of the lack of customs borders between Russia and other FSU countries.
15 
Pressure from various lobbies gradually led to dilution of the system of export quotas, 
taxes, and mandatory sale of foreign currency earnings. 
                                              
15 Estonia, for example, became one of the biggest exporters of non-ferrous scrap to Western Europe. Economic Transition in ... 
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Table 6: Foreign Trade with FSU countries and Rest of the World in 1992-1994 (in 
millions of current U.S. dollars) 
Country   1992  1993  1994 
Belarus  Exports to FSU  2467.0 2109.1  1610.8 
  Exports to ROW  1061.0 832.1  1039.4 
  Imports from FSU  -2692.0 -2304.9  -2504.0 
  Imports from ROW  -751.0 -911.8  -621.2 
Russia  Exports to FSU  18998.0 14000.0  16400.0 
  Exports to ROW  38184.0 44400.0  49500.0 
  Imports from FSU  -13196.7 -9300.0  -14000.0 
  Imports from ROW  -35074.5 -34900.0  -39600.0 
Ukraine  Exports to FSU  5308.0 7076.0  5697.0 
  Exports to ROW  6000.0 3765.0  4236.0 
  Imports from FSU  -6430.0 -9745.0  -7460.0 
  Imports from ROW  -5500.0 -2924.0  -2666.0 
Source:  IMF data; Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research in Minsk; Ukrainian 
  Economic Trends, TACIS 
The regulations concerning import were relaxed to a much greater extent (no 
import duties were collected until the end of August 1992, and until the end of 1992 
no value added tax was levied on imported goods). The artificially high exchange rate 
of foreign currency was the main barrier to imports.  
On July 1, 1992, the second stage of the liberalization of foreign trade began. A 
uniform market exchange rate of the ruble against foreign currencies was introduced. 
As of September 1, 1992, the unified rate was also applied to credit operations. 
However, for some "sensitive" imports (foodstuffs, medicines), the artificially 
appreciated ruble exchange rate was in use. In the first half of 1992 the privileged 
imports accounted for about 40% of total imports, but in the second half this share 
declined to about 10% (see Dąbrowski et al., 1993). 
In July 1992 the government began to use the market rate for the entire portion 
(50%) of foreign exchange export proceeds subject to mandatory sale. On August 1, 
1992, a 15% import duty was introduced, and from the beginning of 1993 value added 
tax was collected on imported goods. 
During 1993 and 1994 the number of types of goods subject to export quotas 
was declining (in January 1994 export quotas were applied to 14 types of goods), and 
the differences between domestic and external prices were narrowing. According to 
many agreements between the Russian government and the IMF, most export barriers 
should have had been cancelled. In spite of this, in 1993 and 1994 the amount and 
weight of measures to administer external trade rose. Besides the system of export 
quotas and differentiated export duties, three additional barriers gained in 
significance: the export licensing procedure, centralized import, and import tariffs. 
Centralized import was finally abolished on January 1, 1994. The procedure for M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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granting a limited number of export licences was from the very beginning highly 
questionable and still constitutes a battle field for different lobbies. Finally, all export 
barriers should be abolished after the signing of the stand-by agreement with the IMF 
in March 1995. 
Due to the growing purchasing power of Russian consumers combined with the 
easy access to foreign exchange and openness in trade, the importance of import 
barriers is growing. As mentioned above, before July 1, 1992, there were no import 
charges. On that day a 5% import tax was introduced. On September 1, 1992, this tax 
was raised to 15%. On April 1, 1993, a new list of goods subject to import duties was 
drawn up. The highest import charges amounted to 100%. Subsequent changes raised 
import duties, mostly on consumer goods. The direction of changes suggest that 
interests of various lobbies in the industrial and agricultural sectors are to be 
protected. 
1.5. External liberalization in Belarus 
According to the IMF, Belarus was the republic with the biggest share of inter-
republican trade in GDP in 1988. This "openness" in trade within the USSR was not 
transformed into a liberal foreign trade policy after the dissolution of USSR. Until the 
end of January 1992, all the old Soviet exchange rates (mentioned above) were still in 
use. During the whole year 1992 the National Bank of Belarus (NBB) kept in force 
the system of multiple exchange rates. The mandatory surrender of part of exporters’ 
revenues introduced in April 1992 and modified in 1993
16 constituted a form of 
implicit taxation of export and subsidization of centralized government import. 
During 1992 changes in the administered exchange rates narrowed the gap between 
them and market rate. Enterprises not allowed to use administered exchange rates 
could negotiate rates with commercial banks. Based on the weighted average of such 
transactions, NBB calculated the so-called market rate. 
In January 1993, the special exchange rate was replaced by an investment rate 
(for obligatory surrender and direct foreign investment) and the commercial rate was 
replaced by the unified NBB rate (calculated on the weighted average). Since that 
time there were two official (government) exchange rates. However, in March 1993 
obligatory sale of 100% of "soft currencies"
17 was introduced for the purpose of 
collecting currencies for interstate payments. 
The dominant position in Belarussian foreign trade is occupied by state bodies. 
This especially concerns trade with FSU countries (mostly with Russia). The system 
of export quotas and licences, very similar to Russia’s, covered 186 goods in the 
middle of 1994. In December 1994 this list was cut to 66 items. A system of 
centralized export and import of "sensitive" goods (grains, vegetable oil, sugar, dairy 
products, medicines, etc.) also functions in Belarus. 
                                              
16 Exporters to countries outside the FSU have to pay a 10% tax in foreign currencies from export 
revenues and surrender an additional 20% of export revenues using an artificially appreciated Belarussian ruble 
exchange rate.  
17 New currencies of the countries of the FSU. Economic Transition in ... 
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In November 1994 the government and the NBB issued a few decrees further 
deregulating the currency exchange regime. The quota of "soft currencies" subject to 
obligatory sale was reduced to 50%, and individuals and enterprises were given the 
right to hold "soft currencies" in their bank accounts. Commercial banks also received 
the right to buy foreign currencies on their behalf.  
1.6. External liberalization in the Ukraine 
During 1992-93 Ukrainian trade was organized within the system of 
intergovernmental agreements (bilateral agreements have been signed with all except 
one of the FSU countries). Trade was to be implemented through the mechanism of 
quotas and state orders. On December 26, 1992, a decree "On the Special Export 
Regime for Certain Types of Goods" was issued. This decree stipulates that export of 
coal, non-ferrous ores, metals, waste, and scrap, ores of precious metals, oil and oil 
products, gas, electricity and spirits can be carried out only by companies with a 
special permission from the cabinet (usually, only state-owed enterprises qualify). 
Until the end of March 1993, there were three exchange rates: an official rate (a 
highly appreciated rate used for legal and accounting purposes), a commercial rate 
used for trade, and the market rate. Following the decision of the CBRF closing the 
Moscow Interbank Currency Exchange (MICEX) for foreign entities as of June 15, 
1992, the NBU began its own weekly U.S. dollar auction on September 1992. This 
Ukrainian Interbank Currency Exchange (UICE) auction rate was based on the rates 
of transactions in the banking system. The Ukrainian authorities continued, however, 
to set an official exchange rate based on MICEX rate, or on the local auction rate 
when it appreciated more than the one in Moscow. The withdrawal of the Ukraine 
from the ruble area in November 1992 revealed other "market" exchange rates set on 
the basis of commercial bank, NBB, or MICEX rates. This situation changed on 
March 16, 1993, when official rate was unified with the UICE auction rate.  
In 1993 decrees deregulating export activities were issued. Firms were allowed 
to export irrespective of the quota system by paying an export tariff (from 5 to 30%). 
Firms could also purchase quotas at auctions. However, in 1993 the export system as 
a whole remained restrictive and complicated (with many loopholes for the well-
informed). The trade decree issued in January 1993 expanded the number of goods 
subject to quotas, introduced a new mechanism to centralize convertible currency 
exports, and added a new category of "strategic exports." The amount of goods 
covered by quotas rose from 180 in 1992 to 390 in 1993. Licenses were also 
necessary for all exports except manufactured goods. The import regime from the 
beginning was much simpler. There are no nontariff barriers, except for standard 
rules. In January 1993, a system of low import duties was introduced.  
Under the pressure of expansionary monetary policy, the unified exchange rate 
depreciated steadily against both the U.S. dollar and the Russian ruble in the first half 
of 1993. On August 18, the UICE auction rate and official rate were separated. The 
official rate became fixed. In November quotations at the UICE were suspended and 
NBU tenders begun. In October 1994 the UICE resumed auctions, and from October 
24, the official rate was unified again with the UICE auction rate. M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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In the Stand-by Agreement with the IMF, the Ukrainian government stated that 
it will eliminate all remaining export quotas and licences except those on grain and 
goods subject to voluntary export restraints. On the other hand, the Ukrainian 
government started to introduce import barriers such as higher import duties and in 
January 1995 reintroduced import licences. 
2. Macroeconomic policy 
Macroeconomic policy in all three countries was rather weak (Russia) or even 
very weak (the Ukraine until the end of 1993, Belarus from the middle of 1993) 
during the period under analysis. All three countries failed to stabilize their economies 
and even faced the danger of hyperinflation (Russia at the end of 1992, the Ukraine at 
the end of 1993, Belarus at the end of 1993 and beginning of 1994). This situation 
was influenced by many factors, but two important economic determinants play a very 
important role here: the failure to make radical and immediate liberalization at the 
very beginning of transition process and continuing traditional state paternalism in 
relation to SOEs and collective agriculture.  
The failure to complete domestic liberalization has had direct fiscal and quasi-
fiscal consequences. Continuing price control makes it necessary to provide subsidies, 
tax exemptions, and heavily subsidized credit from the central bank (the last 
component creating a quasi-fiscal deficit not recorded officially by fiscal statistics). It 
also decreases budget revenue from the profit tax and VAT. Similar consequences 
result from the maintenance of the system of state orders (goszakazy) and other forms 
of obligatory deliveries. Multiple exchange rate practices mean an additional export 
tax on one hand and the hidden subsidization of preferred import (such as grain and 
medicines in Russia in the first half of 1992 or energy in the Ukraine in 1993-1994) 
on the other. Import was also often subsidized using foreign credit (Russia 1992-
1993). Export quotas and licensing decrease the potential profit of exporters 
(especially in the case of the oil and gas industry in Russia) and possible tax revenues 
of the budget. Helping to maintain the artificially undervalued exchange rate, they 
lead indirectly to import subsidies.  
The level of state paternalism
18 t o w a r d  S O E s  a n d  kolkhozes increased in 
comparison with the past. Although SOEs under the traditional command system 
could expect the government to bail them out in cases of financial crisis, they (and 
especially their managers) were subject to quite rigorous control and discipline 
imposed both by the state administration and the party apparatus. After the collapse of 
the communist system this control disappeared. Moreover, "red" directors became a 
powerful lobby in the newly elected parliaments (see concluding remarks), 
successfully fighting for direct subsidies, tax exemptions, government investment 
programs, inter-enterprise debt clearing operations, state financing of additional 
working capital, and other forms of cheap credit. This pressure was relatively much 
stronger in the cases of Belarus and the Ukraine than in Russia because of political 
factors (see concluding remarks) and the slower pace of the privatization program.  
                                              
18 The idea of state paternalism in relation to the SOE is extensively discussed by Kornai [1980]. Economic Transition in ... 
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Table 7: Fiscal data for Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia (in percent of GDP) 
Belarus 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 
Central Budget     
Revenues    38.5 30.9 28.6 29.6 
Expenditures  36.5 32.9 33.0 32.2 
Balance    2.0 -2.0 -4.4 -2.6 
General Government Budget   
Revenues    47.5 43.3 43.6 36.6 
Expenditures  43.9 46.8 51.9 38.1 
  Subsidies    ...  11.0  12.4  7.1 
Balance    3.6 -3.5 -8.3 -1.5 
Ukraine 
Central Budget     
Revenues    36.5 41.5 41.1 45.0 
Expenditures  50.6 71.9 51.2 55.0 
Balance    -14.1 -30.4 -10.1 -10.0 
General Government Budget   
Revenues    38.3 44.0 42.4  44.9a 
Expenditures  51.9 73.3 52.1  53.0a 
  Subsidies    ...  9.1  5.5  9.1a 
Balance   -13.8  -29.3  -9.7  -8.1a 
a -January-June 
Russia 
   1991 1992 1993 1994 
Federal Government Budget   
Revenues    23.6 16.6 13.7 11.0 
Expenditures  22.8 27.4 20.3 21.9 
Balance    -0.8 -10.7 -6.7 -10.9 
Local Government Budget   
Revenues    ...  17.6 15.7 17.5 
Expenditures  ...  17.0 16.0 17.0 
Balance    ...  0.6 -0.3 0.5 
Extrabudgetary funds balance     
    -2.2 2.5 0.6 0.5 
Unbudgeted import subsidies     
    -4.2 -11.9 -2.1  ... 
General Government Budget   
  Subsidies    ...  8.9  8.6  7.5 
Balance    -5.7 -18.8 -7.6  -9.9 
Source:  IMF data; Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research in Minsk; Ukraine 
  Numbers (TACIS); Ukraine in Numbers by Michael Zienchuk 
Though generally all three countries have had problems with balancing their 
fiscal accounts, table 7 shows us that the size and trends of fiscal deficits in each 
country were different. The Russian Federation
19 and the Ukraine were running 
                                              
19 If we take into consideration the huge deficit of the all-union budget of the USSR which was de facto 
assumed by the Russian Federation, the total fiscal deficit of this country in 1991 was far greater (see part I). M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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serious fiscal deficits as early as 1990, at which time Belarus recorded fiscal surpluses 
both in the central budget and in general government accounts. The same differences 
were repeated in 1992: the Ukraine ran an enormous fiscal deficit of 30.4% of GDP 
(central budget) or 29.3% of GDP (general government), followed by Russia, with 
deficits of 10.7% of GDP (federal government) and 18.8% of GDP (general 
government). Belarus recorded a deficit of only 2% of GDP (central budget) or 3.6% 
of GDP (general government). The latter country seemed to be successful in 
maintaining some kind of financial discipline especially in respect to social programs 
and enterprise financing. Given the very limited progress of systemic reforms in 
Belarus, this should be seen as a sort of continuation of the traditional control and 
discipline typical for the centrally planned economy. This collapsed during the next 
year as a result of political decomposition (the beginning of the presidential election 
campaign of Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich) and external shock (serious real 
adjustment of oil and gas import prices). In 1993 Belarus recorded a deficit of 4.4% of 
GDP (central budget) and 8.3% of GDP (general government). The Ukraine’s deficit 
amounted 10.1% of GDP (central budget) or 9.7% of GDP (general government). 
Russia’s deficit amounted 6.7% of GDP (central budget) or 7.6% of GDP general 
government. The next year (1994) brought an improvement of the Belarussian 
situation (deficit on the level of 2.6% of GDP and 1.5% of GDP respectively), a 
worsening of Russian fiscal accounts (10.9% and 9.9%), and stabilization of the size 
of Ukrainian deficit (ca. 10% of GDP in the case of the central budget).  
The above characteristics gives us a picture of the different tracks of fiscal 
policy in each country. We have already mentioned Belarus’s relative fiscal austerity 
(with the exception of the second half of 1993 and the beginning of 1994). In 1991 
and 1992, the Ukraine represented the extreme case of post-communist 
macroeconomic populism, without any real control of government spending. In the 
beginning of 1993 the Kuchma-Pynzenyk government tried to impose some fiscal 
discipline, which resulted in a smaller budget deficit, especially in the first quarter of 
the year. Later this policy collapsed, and both Pynzenyk and Kuchma left the 
government. At the beginning of 1994 fiscal and monetary policies were toughened 
again, resulting in a significant decrease of the inflation rate in the spring and summer 
of that year. Unfortunately, the summer of 1994 brought the next loosening, brought 
to a halt in the last quarter of 1994, when the Ukraine signed the STF agreement with 
the IMF and started a more comprehensive stabilization policy (with a fiscal deficit of 
3.3% of GDP planned for 1995). 
Russia attempted to stabilize its economy at least three times (the fourth attempt 
has been underway during the spring of 1995). The Gaidar team was successful in 
balancing the central budget for the first four months of 1992 but later lost control 
over both the expenditure and the revenue side. Boris Fedorov tried to discipline fiscal 
policy in 1993 with moderate success. However, this effort did not suffice to reduce 
inflation to a monthly level below 10% (Fedorov’s effort was never really supported 
by the CBRF). During the next year the Chernomyrdin government tried to stabilize 
again (with the support of the second tranche of STF) but the final fiscal result was 
worse than that of the previous year. In 1995 First Deputy Prime Minister Anatolii 
Chubais is repeating the stabilization effort, which includes a budget deficit target not 
exceeding 6% of GDP. Economic Transition in ... 
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Table 8 illustrates the large role of producer subsidies in creating fiscal tensions. 
In practice the entire fiscal deficit can be explained by this factor. The relatively high 
level of subsidies reflects both the shortcomings of the liberalization process and the 
state paternalism toward the enterprise sector. 
Table 8: Total producer subsidies as % of GDP (1992-1994) 
Country 1992 1993 1994 
Belarus 11.0  12.4 7.1
Russia 8.9  8.6 7.5
Ukraine 9.1  5.5 9.1a
a January-July 
Source: IMF data 
Monetary policy is the second standard pillar of any stabilization effort. In the 
case of post-communist economies, especially in the initial stage of the transition 
process, monetary policy is strongly influenced by the fiscal situation because money 
creation is the only really available source of deficit financing. 
Table 9 shows the quarterly and monthly average trends of the money supply in 
each country. There can be no doubt that monetary policy has been expansive or even 
very expansive during the entire period under analysis in all three countries. This is 
true even of periods when the fiscal policy was relatively tight. This means that the 
money supply was determined not only by the financing of the budget deficit; it 
shows indirectly that central banks have also played an important quasi-fiscal role by 
providing SOEs and collective farms with cheap credits. These credits usually carried 
interest rates far below the inflation rate and were rarely repaid to the central banks. In 
practice they have not differed very much from standard budget subsidies. Therefore 
we must interpret the formal fiscal statistics with great caution. Very often the central 
bank and its credit emission have simply played the role of an alternative source of 
public sector expenditures. This kind of policy substitution is evident, for example, in 
the case of Belarus in 1994.  
Beginning in the fourth quarter of 1993 the CBRF started to slow down the pace 
of monetary expansion from the monthly average of 15-20% (or even 35% in the third 
quarter of 1992) to a level of 5-10%. The NBU also reduced somewhat the rate of 
monetary expansion in the last quarter of 1993 and the first half of 1994, thus 
avoiding the danger of hyperinflation which really existed at the end of 1993. In 
contrast, the activity of the National Bank of Belarus, which had been relatively 
responsible in 1992, became far more expansionary in following years. 
The limited size of this paper does not allow us to make a more detailed analysis 
of the central banks’ credit activities. However, one specific item is worth mentioning: 
the financing of the ruble area by the CBRF in 1992-1993 (see Dąbrowski and 
Antczak, forthcoming). In the first half of 1992 this occurred through unlimited 
automatic financing of the active balances of the ruble area countries on their 
correspondent accounts with the CBRF. In July 1992, the legal form of this financing 
was changed, into so-called technical credits granted by the CBRF to other Table 9: Quarterly and monthly money supply percentage changes for Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in 1992-93  
 
Country     1992      1993      1994   
   Mar.  June  Sept.  Dec.  Mar.  June  Sept.  Dec.  Mar.  June  Sept.  Dec. 
    
Belarus  M3 quarterly % change  40,96 26,63 52,83 74,57 94,65 93,63  71,98 62,88 112,34 89,25 103,09 134,98
  M3 monthly aver. % change  12,12 8,19 15,19 20,41 24,86 24,64  19,81 17,66 28,53 23,69 26,64 32,95
  M0 quarterly % change  8,43 -49,93 108,86 68,65 99,20 150,77 106,71 25,64 82,84 132,83 80,96 98,67
  M0 monthly aver. % change  2,73 -20,59 27,83 19,03 25,82 35,86  27,39 7,90 22,28 32,54 21,86 25,71
    
Russia  M3 quarterly % change  35,29 72,93 146,88 52,04 59,64 68,85  38,22 18,25 31,05 33,01 30,47 27,50
  M3 monthly aver. % change  10,60 20,03 35,15 14,99 16,87 19,08  11,39 5,75 9,43 9,97 9,27 8,43
  M0 quarterly % change  38,73 86,67 120,98 69,49 52,50 99,80 64,46 58,21 19,51 49,69 26,05 21,67
  M0 monthly aver. % change  11,53 23,13 30,25 19,23 15,10 25,95  18,04 16,52 6,12 14,39 8,02 6,76
    
Ukraine  M3 quarterly % change  42,84 107,03 62,33 99,70 135,21 84,86 177,41 55,70 43,72 59,25 71,58 71,51
  M3 monthly aver. % change  12,62 27,45 17,52 25,93 32,99 22,73  40,51 15,90 12,85 16,78 19,72 19,70
  M0 quarterly % change  79,88 177,30 103,56 40,73 86,34 86,89 208,32 146,22 80,38 44,47 56,27 51,92
  M0 monthly aver. % change  21,62 40,49 26,74 12,06 23,05 23,18  45,55 35,03 21,73 13,05 16,04 14,96
Source: IMF data; Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research in Minsk; Ukrainian Economic Trends, TACIS; authors 
 calculations Economic Transition in ... 
  - 27 -  CASE Foundation 
CIS states and overdrafts on those countries’ correspondent accounts. In this way the 
CBRF provided financing to other CIS states (mainly the Ukraine, Belarus, 
Kazakhstan, and other Central Asia NISs) amounting to 8.2% of Russian GDP in 
1992 and 3% of Russian GDP in 1993 (IEA, 1995, table 1.4.). In the second half of 
1993 this form of external financing was stopped. Due to the specific institutional 
arrangements existing in 1992-1993 in the ruble area, the Ukraine and Belarus could 
"export" some of the inflationary consequences of their expansionary monetary 
policies to Russia. This was especially true of the Ukraine, which was the ’leader’ in 
organizing the subsequent inter-enterprises debt clearing operations.  
The analyzed countries did not use other instruments of macroeconomic 
stabilization. They did not have any restrictive income policies. Only Boris Fedorov 
in Russia tried to use a fixed exchange rate in the second half of 1993 to stabilize the 
ruble but this policy was rather weak and lasted only a few months.  
3. Privatization, restructuring, and institutional reforms 
3.1. Privatization 
On the privatization front, Russia has left the two other analyzed countries far 
behind. In spite of its unsuccessful stabilization (see previous section) and incomplete 
liberalization (especially external - see section 1), the Russian government has begun 
a very ambitious privatization program. It included: 
1.  Small privatization, based on the sale for cash (through public auction) of state 
assets, mainly stores, repair shops, small enterprises. This process, initiated with 
the help of IFC (International Finance Corporation) experts in Nizhnii Novgorod 
in the beginning of 1992, spread very quickly throughout the territory of Russia. 
2.  Mass corporatization of most of the medium-size and large state enterprises. The 
main effort of this process occurred in the fall of 1992 and beginning of 1993.  
3.  Emission of privatization vouchers for all citizens of the Russian Federation on 
October 1, 1992. The voucher was a bearer instrument, and was easily 
transferable. 
4.  The so-called "large" privatization of enterprises which had previously 
undergone corporatization, according to three models, varying by the extent of 
privileges to insiders (management and employees). In each of these methods the 
voucher plays an essential role. The voucher privatization process was initiated in 
December 1992, gained significant pace in 1993, and was completed on June 30, 
1994. The second method, giving the largest preferences to the employees, was 
definitely the dominant one. It has been utilized in about two thirds of privatized 
enterprises (Jermakowicz, Pańk￿w, and Abramov, 1994). On July 1, 1994, 
voucher privatization was replaced by a more traditional commercial 
privatization (i.e., selling shares for cash), with preference given to strategic 
investors offering serious restructuring plans. However, the pace of large 
privatization in this stage has been far slower than during the voucher period.  
5.  The formation of open mutual funds, receiving privatization vouchers (and cash) 
from citizens and investing in enterprises undergoing privatization on their M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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behalf. The process of formation of the funds was initiated in the first months of 
1993, and gained pace during the late spring and summer of that year. 
6.  The spontaneous emergence of new private firms, mainly in trade and services 
(including street trade).
20 Some of the newly forming private firms do business in 
the so-called second economy, meaning that their activity is partially or entirely 
unregistered. 
7.  The formation of firms with participation of foreign capital (sovmestnye 
predpriyatiya). This process is not yet very advanced. It is concentrated mainly in 
trade, services, and small-scale manufacturing as well as in certain regions 
(Moscow, St. Petersburg, the Far East). 
8.  The initiation of agricultural privatization, authorized by a special decree of 
President Yeltsin at the end of October 1993. Earlier, transformations in 
agriculture were effectively blocked politically by a strong kolkhoz-sovkhoz 
lobby in the Supreme Soviet, which did not allow the passage of constitutional 
amendments and bills allowing land turnover. This problem was finally solved 
by the new constitution of December 1993. However, after key reformers such as 
Gaidar and Fedorov left the government in January 1994 the development of the 
private sector in agriculture was stopped again. 
The complex and consistent policy of the State Committee for the Management 
of State Property headed in 1992-1994 by Anatolii Chubais allowed Russia to 
achieve, in a relatively short period of time, significant quantitative results in the 
privatization sphere, placing it in the position of a definite leader among post-Soviet 
countries, and perhaps even in comparison to certain Central and Eastern European 
countries. Statistically, more than 50% of Russian GDP is produced by the private and 
privatized sector.  
Denationalization appears to be irrevocable in Russia. It also indirectly 
contributes to the weakening of the traditional branch structures of management and 
the relics of the command economy system. The qualitative characteristics of Russian 
privatization are controversial, however. The most frequently mentioned reservations 
are: 
1.  The corporatization and "large" privatization processes were not preceded by a 
deconcentration of the existing state enterprises, especially in industry and 
foreign trade; in addition, the authorities often failed to eliminate various 
regulations giving them monopolistic rights. A danger thus exists that many state 
monopolists will be transformed into private ones, and can also make the process 
of structural changes at the enterprise level more difficult. 
2.  Privatization was and is being performed in conditions of high inflation, a not 
fully liberalized economy, and very imperfect competition (especially by foreign 
competitors). This creates the threat that the participants of the privatization 
process will make erroneous investment decisions and that many privatized 
enterprises will go bankrupt in the future. Formally privatized enterprises are still 
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functioning under "soft" budget constraint conditions. This increases the 
likelihood of the appearance of strong rent-seeking groups in the private sector 
opposed to consistent stabilization, the hardening of budget constraints for 
enterprises, and the liberalization of the Russian economy. 
3.  Both the small and large privatization processes have so far given immense 
advantages to insiders (i.e., management and employees), who have, for the most 
part, not changed since the collapse of the previous system (in contrast to, for 
example, the far-reaching personnel changes among directors of state enterprises 
in Poland in 1990-1991). This casts into doubt the ability of privatized 
enterprises to make deeper adjustments such as the reduction of excessive 
employment. 
4.  Similar doubts are also raised by the threat of excessive dispersion of property 
rights as a result of strong preferences for employees and the broad distribution 
of vouchers to the population. Because of these factors, a distinct strategic 
investor interested in increasing profits might not appear in privatized 
enterprises. The designers of the Russian privatization program intended the 
spontaneously emerging investment funds to act as a counterbalance to the 
tendencies of excessive share dispersion. However, many of these funds had a 
strongly speculative character and some of them (e.g., MMM) even behave like 
typical financial pyramids. Such practices strongly undermined the credibility of 
the investment funds. The Security and Exchange Commission was created only 
at the beginning of 1995 and the relevant legislation is in the final stages of 
preparation in the Duma and the Federal Council in June 1995.  
Generally speaking, Russia had to rely on non-equivalent methods of 
distribution of state-owned assets, at least temporarily giving up restructuring targets. 
Alternative solutions such as East German massive commercial privatization 
(organized by the Treuhand) or Polish and Hungarian multi-track approach were not 
feasible economically or politically. The political window of opportunity for mass 
privatization was very narrow and was utilized very adeptly by Anatolii Chubais. 
The qualitative weaknesses of the Russian privatization do not mean that this 
country lost a chance for substantial restructuring, as the concentration of diluted 
ownership will progress in the future. There is also hope that investment funds created 
on a voluntary basis can play a significant role in the restructuring process. Since 
mass privatization is based on individual, exclusive, and fully transferable property 
rights, it does not exclude prospects for real private ownership control in privatized 
enterprises. In the case of Russia, the final result of mass privatization will strongly 
depend on the macroeconomic stability and effective liberalization of its economy 
(see the two previous sections) and on the ability of the Russian state to provide 
economic agents some basic public goods such as effective protection of property 
rights, public enforcement of private contracts, public security, etc. 
As mentioned earlier, the Ukraine and Belarus lagged far behind Russia in their 
privatization policies. From 1992 to 1994 only very limited local experiments with 
small-scale privatization took place in both countries. The few large privatization 
projects carried out consisted mainly of cases of strongly leveraged management M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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buyouts. The late perestroika system of collective leasing (arenda) was continued in 
both countries. Of course, the lack of an official privatization policy did not stop the 
unofficial or even illegal nomenklatura type of privatization, manifested by the earlier 
mentioned hidden transfers of profits and assets from SOEs to private firms.  
At the very end of 1994 the Ukraine finally initiated a comprehensive and 
ambitious privatization program supported by a World Bank rehabilitation loan 
program which has contained:  
1.  acceleration of small-scale privatization; 
2.  implementation of the one-step mass corporatization of SOEs together with the transfer of 
state property rights from the branch ministries to the State Property Fund responsible for the 
privatization policy; 
3.  launching of mass privatization, a voucher-type program based on a combination of the 
Russian and Czech programs (the strong limitation of privileges for employees is the main 
difference from the Russian scheme); 
4.  spontaneous creation of investment funds and preparation of regulations of the security 
market. 
At the time of writing (June 1995), it is still too early to assess the final results of 
the new Ukrainian privatization approach. It does, however, look very promising so 
far.  
In Belarus, despite some progressive changes in privatization legislation and in 
the government privatization program (which also includes voucher-type mass 
privatization), this process has not really started yet (see Antczak, Kozarzewski, and 
Połomski, 1995).  
Agriculture privatization is proceeding very slowly in all three countries. The 
traditional Soviet-type kolkhozes and sovkhozes (sometimes converted formally into 
joint-stock companies) still dominate this sector. Real private farms still play a very 
marginal role and their number increase very slowly. By the end of 1994, 279,000 
private farms were registered in Russia, with an average size of 43 hectares, 
occupying 5% of total agricultural land (IEPPP, 1995, p. 115). In the first quarter of 
1995, 33,000 private farms were registered in the Ukraine, with an average size of 22 
hectares, occupying 1.8% of total agricultural land (Ukrainian Economic Trends, 
April 1995, pp. 52-53). Belarus has the worst figures, with only 2,000 private farms at 
the end of 1992, producing about 1% of agricultural output (Antczak, Kozarzewski, 
and Połomski, 1995). (The situation has not changed significantly since then.)  
3.2. Microeconomic restructuring and institutional reforms 
Measuring the progress of microeconomic restructuring is a very difficult task. 
We can rely only on some indirect indicators such as unemployment rate, 
remembering, however, that the latter is also influenced by many other factors such as 
the tightness of social regulations (e.g., ease of access to unemployment benefits), by 
the size of external shocks, etc. Bearing in mind these limitations and looking at table 
10, we see that the FSU countries have generally lower unemployment rates than CEE 
countries (excepting the Czech Republic). The interpretation of this fundamental 
difference is not easy. There is a plausible hypothesis (see, e.g., Layard and Richter, 
1994) that the FSU countries have a more flexible labor market and less social Economic Transition in ... 
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guarantees than CEE ones. However, taking into consideration the enormous size of 
structural shocks (external and domestic) experienced by FSU countries in 
comparison with their CEE neighbors (which would imply higher unemployment and 
not lower), the labor market factor cannot explain all the difference. It is quite clear 
that FSU countries, especially CIS ones, lag significantly behind CEE in respect to 
microeconomic restructuring. Among the three analyzed countries Russia seems to be 
the most advanced in this process. The available results of microeconomic research 
(see, e.g., Evseeva-Boeva and Dolgopiatova, forthcoming) show that some kind of 
market-oriented microeconomic adjustment can be observed in Russian enterprises. 
There is little evidence that similar processes are equally advanced in the Ukraine and 
Belarus.  
Table 10: Unemployment rates as percentage of labor force (end of year) in selected East 
European countries 
Country 1989  1990  1991  1992  1993 
Poland 0.1  6.1 11.8 13.6 15.7
Czech 
Republic 
0.0 0.8 4.1 2.6 3.5
Slovakia 0.0  1.5  11.8  10.4  14.4 
Hungary 0.3  2.5  8.0  12.3  12.1 
Estonia  0.0 0.0  0.1 1.9 2.6 
Latvia  0.0 0.0  0.1 2.1 5.3 
Russia  0.0 0.0  0.1 4.8 5.5 
Belarus  1.0 1.0  1.0 0.5 1.5 
Ukraine  0.0 0.0  0.0 0.3 0.4 
Sources: Transition report, EBRD, 1994; Statistical Handbook for FSU, 1994; Russian   Economic 
  Trends, 1994; PlanEcon 
Russia is also the most advanced in the field of institutional reforms, especially 
with respect to financial market legislation and corporate law. The Ukraine is second 
and Belarus third in this ranking. If we look at the actual development of the financial 
sector in the broad sense (commercial banks, investment funds, insurance companies, 
stock exchanges, foreign exchange market, interbank credit market, securities market, 
etc.), Russia is the leader in comparison with the two other analyzed states. In each 
country, however, the financial market is concentrated mainly in the capital city, with 
a real "desert" in the regional and smaller city centers. We must also remember that 
the quality of financial services is generally not very high (excepting a few of the 
biggest Moscow banks) and the assets portfolio in many cases very doubtful. So far 
high inflation and regular injections of subsidized credits have helped to prevent a 
liquidity crisis in the banking sector. In the coming months, however, with inflation 
expected to come down and strongly positive real interest rates, we may expect a 
serious banking crisis in Russia and the Ukraine.  M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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Part III: Macroeconomic Performance 
In this part we will discuss the inflation and exchange rate performance as well 
as GDP trends in each country. This does not, of course, constitute a full picture of 
macroeconomic situation, but it allows us to learn about the consequences of adopted 
policies.  
1. Inflation and money velocity 
Table 11 and chart 1 illustrate the inflation record of each country. Generally, all 
three countries failed to bring inflation under control, which corresponds very well 
with the monetary statistics (see section II.2). There is no doubt that expansionary 
monetary policy must be seen as the primary source of very high inflation in the 
analyzed countries. Although Russia and the Ukraine were able to decrease the 
inflation rate to a monthly level of 4-5% in the summer of 1994, the lack of progress 
in monetary control made this success only temporary. Generally, the inflation rate 
has followed (with a 3-4 month time lag) the rate of money growth. Money velocity 
(see table 12) shows an increasing trend, though with some fluctuation.
21 The 
relatively limited acceleration of money velocity might be surprising, given the high 
rate of nominal money expansion and thus of seigniorage. In more market oriented 
economies such as those of Latin American countries such high rates of money 
creation would probably lead to hyperinflation very quickly. Economic agents in the 
FSU are less experienced with high inflation and more ready to pay the inflation tax. 
The underdeveloped financial sector and dominance of SOEs has also made the 
analyzed economies less vulnerable to the damage created by the inflation tax. 
After the initial price adjustment in January 1992, the Ukraine has had the 
highest cumulative inflation record with a short hyperinflation episode in the second 
half of 1993. Belarus was second in this ranking, balancing in the second half of 1993 
and all of 1994 on the verge of hyperinflation. Russia has the lowest cumulative 
inflation, with a general decreasing trend, though with periodic resurgence of the 
inflation rate. Even Russia is far behind the Baltic and Central European standards, 
not to mention Western norms of inflation. 
2. Nominal and real exchange rate 
A very similar picture is shown in chart 2. All three currencies have the same 
starting point - the old Soviet ruble. Already in January 1992 each country recorded a 
different market exchange rate, though they had still the same currency. The sources 
of these differences probably lay in the different extent of price liberalization, 
different multiple exchange rate practices, and different levels of development of 
financial markets and their segmentation between countries. However, the differences 
in the pace of monetary expansion became a main determinant of exchange rate 
                                              
21 The money velocity data must be treated, however, with some caution because of low quality of 
quarterly GDP statistics. Table 11: Consumer Price Indexes for Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine in 1991-1995 (first quarter) 
 
  1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 
 Belarus Russia  Ukraine Belarus Russia  Ukraine Belarus Russia Ukraine  Belarus Russia Ukraine Belarus Russia Ukraine
January 5.9 6.2  3.7 181.0 245.0 285.2 14.8 26.0 73.2  40.7 17.9 19.2 39,2 17.8 21.2
February 11.5 4.9  4.7 51.8 38.0 15.3 19.7 25.0 28.8  18.7 10.8 12.6 33,7 11.0 18.1
March 3.9 6.3  8.4 18.1 30.0 12.1 28.1 20.0 22.1  10.2 7.4 5.7 20 10.0 11.4
April 507 63.5  66.4 18.5 22.0 7.6 24.7 19.0 23.6  28.6 8.5 6.0
May 3.4 3.0  1.2 16.8 12.0 14.4 19.6 18.0 27.6  28.7 6.9 5.2
June 2.5 1.2  0.8 12.9 19.0 26.5 26.3 20.0 71.7  19.5 6.0 3.9
July 2.0 0.6  0.5 12.8 11.0 22.1 23.2 22.0 37.6  26.6 5.3 2.1
August 0.4 0.5  0.3 8.7 9.0 8.3 25.1 26.0 21.7  53.4 4.6 2.6
September 0.7 1.1  2.5 9.1 12.0 10.6 36.0 23.0 80.3  25.5 7.2 7.3
October 3.7 3.5  6.3 14.2 23.0 12.4 44.6 20.0 66.1  25.7 11.8 22.6
November 6.6 8.9  7.4 22.7 26.0 22.0 43.2 16.0 45.3  40.5 14.2 72.3
December 10.7 12.1  10.7 30.1 25.0 35.1 45.5 13.0 90.8  31.3 16.4 28.4
Source: IMF data; Ukrainian Economic Trends, TACIS 
 
 
Table 12: Velocity of Broad Money in Belarus, Russia, and Ukraine (quarterly GDP/ end-of-period M3)  
(Percent change over previous month) 
Country   1992      1993      1994   
 Mar.  June  Sept.  Dec.  Mar.  June  Sept.  Dec.  Mar.  June  Sept.  Dec. 
      
Belarus  1,00 1,26 1,22 1,48 0,69 0,34 0,63 1,60 0,99 1,05 1,77 2,27
Russia  0,86 0,83 0,54 0,62 0,93 1,05 1,12 1,55 1,54 1,74 1,58 1,68
Ukraine  1,37 1,24 1,09 0,92 1,01 1,09 1,13 1,89 2,17 1,75 1,30 1,59
Source: IMF data; Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research in Minsk; Ukrainian Economic Trends, TACIS; authors 
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differentiation very quickly. This process started to accelerate in the second half of 
1992, after the CBRF stopped the automatic monetary financing of inter-republican 
correspondent accounts and de facto separated CIS non-cash rubles from the Russian 
non-cash ruble.  
Table 13: Real Exchange Rates for Belarus, Russia, Ukraine in 1992- 1995 (first quarter) 
(January 1992=100) 
   Belarus  Russia  Ukraine 
1992 February 68,8  53,6 71,0 
 March  63,6  38,8  70,3 
 April  57,9  28,5  65,4 
 May  43,3  22,6  48,6 
 June  36,8  20,1  45,2 
 July 36,1  21,6  59,6 
 August  37,7  25,3  70,0 
 September  46,6  27,9  108,1 
 October  56,6  35,6  127,8 
 November  60,8  31,7  162,2 
 December  55,4  23,6  124,9 
1993 January  52,8  25,8 96,4 
 February  51,1  21,4  112,2 
 March  53,7  20,5  133,4 
 April  63,9  20,8  148,6 
 May  64,6  21,9  116,4 
 June  62,3  18,9  90,0 
 July 53,1  14,4  94,6 
 August  42,4  11,5  228,1 
 September  59,3  11,0  126,9 
 October  46,6  9,3  139,7 
 November  50,9  8,3  77,5 
 December  36,1  7,5  40,6 
1994 January  26,9 7,3 34,1 
 Febuary  28,3  7,3  36,6 
 March  43,6  7,3  34,6 
 April  39,4  7,0  39,8 
 May  36,9  6,9  41,1 
 June  39,1  6,8  39,5 
 July 31,4  6,7  38,7 
 August  28,2  6,8  38,1 
 September  32,9  7,0  41,5 
 October  33,4  7,8  57,3 
 November  27,4  7,2  45,9 
 December  26,7  6,7  33,8 
1995 January  21,1 6,4 31,4 
 February  15,8  6,4  28,6 
 March  13,0  6,6  26,5 
Source: IMF data; Russian Economic Trends; Ukrainian Economic Trends, TACIS Economic Transition in ... 
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The direction of differences in the cumulative rates of nominal depreciation of 
individual currencies
22 generally reflects differences in their cumulative inflation 
records. During the period under analysis, the Russian ruble lost nominally 24 times 
less in relation to the US dollar than the Belarussian ruble and 27 times less than the 
Ukrainian karbovanets. However, if we analyze the quantitative relationship between 
the nominal depreciation rate and the inflation rate more carefully, we see substantial 
differences between individual currencies. They reflect the differences in the speed of 
real appreciation (see chart 3 and table 13) of individual currencies. Generally, all 
three currencies appreciated really in relation to the US dollar during the period 
January 1992-March 1995, which reflects the progress in eliminating monetary 
overhang, exchange rate unification, and some liberalization of foreign trade. The real 
appreciation of the Russian ruble has been the highest so far, due to the positive terms 
of trade shock (the reverse of the other two countries’ experience) on the one hand and 
the most progress in macroeconomic stabilization of the three analyzed countries on 
the other. The Ukraine saw a smaller real appreciation, due to extremely unfavorable 
terms of trade changes and the relatively long duration of a very soft macroeconomic 
policy. Throughout most of 1993, the Ukraine recorded a real depreciation of the 
karbovanets in comparison with January 1992. This was the result of both high 
inflationary expectations and the reintroduction of multiple exchange rate practices in 
the second half of 1993.  
3. Decline of GDP 
A deep output decline has been a common phenomenon for all the transition 
economies independently of the transition strategy adopted and seems to be affected 
by a combination of various macroeconomic and microeconomic factors (see 
Dąbrowski, 1995; Holzmann, GÆcs, and Winckler, 1995).  
Table 14: Real GDP percentage change in Belarus, Russia, and the Ukraine, 1990-1994 
Country  1990 1991 1992 1993 1994  Cumulative record 
1990-4 
Belarus 1.9  -1.9  -9.6 -11.7 -21.5 -37.4 
Russia -3.0  -13.0  -19.0 -12.0 -15.0 -48.9 
Ukraine -3.6  -12.0  -17.0 -17.0 -23.0 -55.0 
Source: IMF data; Independent Institute for Socio-Economic and Political Research in Minsk 
Table 14 and chart 4 give us information about the size of the output decline in 
each country in every transition year and cumulatively for the entire period under 
analysis. Table 15 shows that the size of cumulative output decline was far bigger in 
the analyzed countries than in the Central European fast reformers and Estonia.
23 
                                              
22 This comparison takes into consideration the redenomination of the Belarussian ruble which occurred 
in the second half of 1994 (10:1). All nominal figures concerning this currency exclude the effect of the 
redenomination. 
23 Both tables use different sources of information and cover different periods. Thus, they do not contain 
fully comparable data. However, this does not alter general picture. Economic Transition in ... 
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Even taking into consideration the greater severity of external and structural shocks in 
the FSU countries than those experienced in Poland, Hungary, or Slovenia, this rough 
comparison gives strong evidence against slow and inconsistent reforms (see 
Dąbrowski, 1995).  
Table 15: GDP growth (+) or decline (-) in selected transition economies 
Country  1989 1990  1991 1992 1993 1994  Cumulative 
1989-1994 
Poland +0.2  -11.5 -7.6 +2.6 +3.8 +4.5 -8.8 
Czech Republic  +0.4  -3.0 -10.0 -5.0 -0.3 +1.5 -15.7 
Slovakia -1.0  -2.5 -11.2 -7.0 -4.1 +3.4 -21.0 
Albania +9.8  -10.0 -27.7 -9.7 +11.0 +8.0 -22.7 
Estonia +3.3  -8.1 -11.3 -19.3 -2.1 +5.9 -29.5 
Latvia +5.7  -3.4 -8.3 -33.8 -11.7 +4.1 -43.0 
Hungary +0.7  -3.5 -11.9 -4.5 -2.0 +1.0 -19.0 
Slovenia -3.6  -2.6 -9.3 -6.5 +1.0 +4.0 -16.4 
Lithuania +1.1  -6.9 -13.1 -37.7 -16.5 +4.7 -55.5 
Source: The World Bank, IMF and PlanEcon data base 
The attempt to maintain the output level at any price was the main factor in the 
adoption of very soft macroeconomic policies in Russia, the Ukraine, and Belarus. 
Ironically, this policy had the completely opposite effect: all three analyzed countries 
probably lost a great deal of output as a result of permanent high inflation. Very 
importantly, however, the fact that these heavy losses have already been incurred will 
not prevent further losses of output when stabilization programs are finally 
implemented.  
We can also observe several important microeconomic factors influencing the 
scale of output decline in the analyzed countries. As we discussed in part I of this 
paper, the extent of inherited structural distortions was enormous. These distortions 
were enhanced by the collapse of interrepublican trade in 1992-1993. Some other 
structural factors such as demilitarization, the decreasing investment rate, changes in 
the structure of investment demand, rationalization of interregional links (especially in 
Russia), the elimination of forced substitution, and greater consumer freedom 
(resulting from the elimination of the rationing system and from privatization of part 
of collective consumption [e.g., housing]) have also seriously affected the activity of 
some sectors.  
The Ukraine and Belarus underwent an external price shock as a result of the 
price adjustment of imported Russian energy (and other raw materials). In 1993-1994 
the Ukrainian government wanted to isolate enterprises from this external price shock 
by maintaining explicit or implicit subsidies (this also occurred to some extent in 
Belarus). Of course, this policy led only to serious fiscal and balance of payments 
crises and to a physical shortage of critical inputs such as energy, which also Economic Transition in ... 
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depressed the level of production. Russia was theoretically in a position to gain from 
terms of trade changes, but this has not happened so far. Probably this will occur later, 
when the liberalization and stabilization of the Russian economy are complete and the 
process of structural adjustment more advanced. 
Finally, the collapse of the mobilizing role and incentives of the command 
system created a motivational vacuum which, because of delays in liberalization and 
privatization and the continuing presence of soft budget constraints, was not replaced 
very quickly by market forces and incentives. Widely held expectations of the 
massive bailout of state enterprises by the government tended to prevent adjustment 
by the SOEs to the new environment and stimulated an explosion of inter-enterprise 
debt (see Rostowski, 1993). The slow privatization process in the Ukraine and Belarus 
and the presence of hidden, nomenklatura-type ownership changes (see section II.3) 
also help to explain the low level of official economic activity.  
Even if the greater extent of the output decline in the FSU
24 in comparison with 
CEE can be rationally explained, it is more difficult to interpret the differences within 
the analyzed group. The worst record, that of the Ukraine, can be explained both by 
the scale of structural shock and by the very populist macroeconomic policy carried 
out in 1991-1993. More surprising, however, is the relatively good record of Belarus 
in comparison with the Russian Federation. Perhaps the quality of statistical data, the 
size of the unregistered private sector (larger in Russia) and Belarus’s relative delay in 
initiating the restructuring process can explain these differences. 
The transition economy is a two-sector economy in the following sense: one part 
of the economy (mainly SOEs in heavy and military industries, large industrial 
construction, and sometimes also in socialized agriculture) is sharply declining 
because of the above mentioned factors, the second part (mainly the new private and 
privatized sector in trade and services) is growing dynamically. The decline of the 
first part, freeing resources such as labor, energy and other inputs, buildings and real 
estate, etc., enables the quick development of the second part. The speed of 
development of the "new economy" depends very much on the degree of real 
economic freedom (i.e., on the comprehensiveness and transparency of liberalization 
process), presence of hard budget constraints, stable macroeconomic environment 
(important for the investment climate), and progress in the privatization and 
restructuring of SOEs. All those factors have been missing so far in Ukraine and 
Belarus and only partly present in Russia. Developments in this sphere will determine 
the prospects of output recovery in the discussed countries. 
                                              
24 Of course, the scale of output decline is overestimated in all the transition economies for some obvious 
methodological reasons (see Bratkowski, 1993). The possibility that the output decline in FSU has been 
overestimated more than in CEE cannot be excluded.  M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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Concluding Remarks: Political Determinants of 
Economic Transition 
Both the similarities and differences between the three analyzed countries can 
be explained mainly by domestic political factors. A broader comparative analysis of 
the transition countries in CEE and the FSU may show a strong correlation between 
the extent of political changes and that of progress achieved in the area of economic 
transition (see e.g., Aslund, 1994a). Countries which have made the most progress in 
the economic transition are usually the ones that have been leaders in the 
democratization process. This is because sound democratization allows for the break-
up of the political and economic domination of the former communist oligarchy 
(nomenklatura) and elimination of economic structures inherited from the communist 
systems (e.g., various types of branch organizations). Countries that have made only 
partial progress in democratization and political liberalization (most CIS countries 
and Rumania) have serious problems with real demonopolization and deconcentration 
of domestic market structures, external liberalization, removal of subsidies and 
hardening of budget constraints, avoiding the organized clearing of inter-enterprise 
arrears, implementing a real positive interest rate policy, implementing large-scale 
and transparent privatization, changing SOE managers, etc. The economic policy of 
these countries is dominated by the strong rent-seeking groups of special interests 
originating mainly from the old structure of the economy.  
The above correlation is not surprising. The economic transition in former 
communist countries would not have begun if political liberalization and 
democratization had not occurred. All experiences with pre-transition reforms shows 
that they never reached certain critical points (such as the abandonment of the 
monopoly of state ownership) because the communist political regime would not 
allow this (even in its most liberal version such as in Hungary or Poland).  
When the communist system finally collapsed at the end of 1980s, two factors 
determined the speed and consistency of economic transition to capitalism: the 
radicalism of political changes and the personal quality of the leadership of economic 
reform.  
The importance of the first factor is connected both with the nature of any 
fundamental economic reform (not only in post-communist countries) and with the 
unclear economic preferences of the post-communist societies. Every serious 
economic policy reform must hurt many existing interests. The enormous agenda of 
post-communist economic transition makes this operation especially difficult. This 
means that the success of economic transition depends both on a strong political 
stimulation and on the weakening of the expected political resistance of the lobbies 
which could lose as a result of the changes. Both are possible only if the political 
transformation is deep enough. This was the case in Poland, Czecho-Slovakia 
(especially the Czech Republic), Hungary, and the Baltic states, where radical Economic Transition in ... 
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political changes created a window of opportunity for radical economic 
transformation.
25 
Radical political changes can also assist economic transition in another way. 
Because of the long break with capitalism (see part I), a significant part of post-
communist societies approved de facto many aspects of the communist economic 
system such as fixed low prices, guaranteed employment, quite substantial social 
welfare programs, etc., even while being strongly politically opposed to the 
communist regime or not enjoying some other aspects of economic life in this system 
(e.g., market shortages, low quality of consumer goods). Thus most or even all the 
transition societies were not prepared to choose expressis verbis the tough pro-market 
and anti-inflationary transition strategy, even if they generally accepted capitalism 
and a Western style of living. The only possible way to gain temporary democratic 
support for carrying out difficult economic reforms was to utilize the general political 
credit vested in the new political elites who were breaking with communism and (in 
many cases) maintaining newly achieved national independence.  
The quality of the new elites is the second important factor which must be taken 
into consideration. The political opportunity to initiate radical reform is a necessary 
condition but not a sufficient one. The period of extraordinary politics (to use 
Balcerowicz’s terminology) is usually very short and is replaced by the period of 
"ordinary" politics when the special interest groups activate themselves again. If the 
economic transition is slow and inconsistent it can create special arbitrage 
opportunities for intensive rent-seeking. Consequently, interest groups built around 
these opportunities (e.g., government bureaucrats distributing export quotas and 
licences, managers of kolkhozes and sovkhozes receiving heavy subsidized credits) 
will struggle strongly against real liberalization and macroeconomic stabilization (see 
Krueger, 1990; Havrylyshyn, Miller, and Perraudin, 1994).  
The short transition history gives us examples of lost chances - Lithuania under 
the Sajudis government (1991-1992), the Ukraine (1991-1993), and partly Russia 
(see below). Once lost, a political window of opportunity for substantial economic 
reform can come again only after some period of time. The negative social and 
political effects of economic mismanagement usually educate both society and 
political elites, changing their attitude toward economic policy priorities. However, 
such an education is very painful and sometimes lasts many years. 
Moving from a general discussion to the countries analyzed in this paper, one 
finds that at the end of 1991 the Ukraine could have been in the best political position 
to start a rapid and consistent economic reform. This was due to the great social 
support for Ukrainian independence, which probably could have been quite easily 
converted into the readiness to bear the necessary economic and economic sacrifices. 
The Estonian and Latvian experiences (both countries started from a similar 
economic and political situation in the end of 1991) provide indirect support for this 
hypothesis. Unfortunately, the Ukrainian political elites lost this chance completely in 
                                              
25 L. Balcerowicz (1994) calls this specific window of opportunity opening after the collapse of 
communism the period of "extraordinary politics." M. D¹browski & R. Antczak 
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the first three years of independence. Only after the presidential election in July 1994 
did the situation begin to change in a positive way. The new president Leonid 
Kuchma have seemed to learn from his own negative experience (as Prime Minister 
from October 1992 to October 1993) as well as that of former president Kravchuk. 
He decided to use the political credit gained during the election to implement a 
comprehensive package of economic reform.  
Russia also had a political window of opportunity for radical economic reform 
after the collapse of the Yanaev coup d’Øtat in August 1991. This occasion was used 
by President Boris Yeltsin to create a reform-oriented government in early November 
1991 with Deputy Prime Minister Egor Gaidar as leader of the economic policy team. 
However, the period of extraordinary politics was relatively short - the rising political 
confrontation between President Yeltsin and Supreme Soviet began in the spring of 
1992. Additionally, the Gaidar team made some conceptual and implementation 
mistakes, failing to make optimal use of the existing political opportunity (Dąbrowski 
et al., 1993; Dąbrowski and Rostowski, 1995). The next window of opportunity, after 
the April 1993 referendum, was lost by Boris Yeltsin himself, who could not use his 
political victory for reconstruction of the government and speeding up the reform 
process. Another period of extraordinary politics, after the collapse of the October 
1993 communist-fascist uprising in Moscow, was too short to make substantial 
progress in stabilization and liberalization. After the December 1993 parliamentary 
elections, Russia was forced to continue its economic transition in the more 
complicated political atmosphere (see Aslund, 1994b).  
Belarus never enjoyed a real period of extraordinary politics because of the lack 
of a radical break with a communist past. The collapse of the August 1991 coup d’Øtat 
brought only minor changes on the Belarussian political scene. The democratic and 
pro-independence political movement in this republic was always very weak and the 
political scene strongly dominated by the political interest groups connected with 
socialized agriculture and large SOEs. This situation resulted in the election of 
President Alexander Lukashenko in July 1994 and results of the May 1995 
referendum and parliamentary election.  
Comparing the Ukraine and Belarus, one notices the great importance of the 
independence factor. The strong presence of this factor in the Ukraine finally 
mobilized the political elites to struggle with the deep economic crisis which began in 
1994 to threaten the unity and independence of the Ukrainian state. In contrast, 
Belarussian political leaders (Prime Minister Vyacheslav Kebich until July 1993 and 
President Lukashenko thereafter) have tried to realize the idea of monetary and 
economic union with Russia as a substitute for real economic transition. 
Analyzing the professional quality of political elites and government 
administration, one must conclude that Russia has an advantage in comparison with 
its two neighbors. Gaidar, Fedorov, and Chubais were able to organize a quite 
impressive team of young market-oriented economists working on transition policy 
(many of them continuing work in the government after the first two left it), whereas 
the Ukraine and Belarus have had very few individual reformists in their 
governments and central banks. This is also true of the broader base of specialists, Economic Transition in ... 
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academic economists (who are usually the natural base for recruitment to reform 
governments), journalists, etc.
26 
Finally, progress in reforming the constitution and electoral laws plays an 
important role. Russia, after the dramatic events of September and October 1993, 
finally has a constitution that separates the legislative and executive branches of 
government, giving the latter a great deal of power (probably even too much) in the 
current management of the economy and fully subordinating the government to the 
president. Russia also has a mixed election law, with half of the Duma elected 
according to a majoritarian scheme and half according to a proportional scheme with 
a 5% minimum. This second component stimulates the building of a system of 
national parties (though this process is still in a rather early stage) and allows the 
Duma to have more professional politicians as its members (and less "red" managers).  
President Kuchma has only just reached (June 1995) a constitutional agreement 
with the Ukrainian parliament allowing him to nominate the cabinet and separating 
the executive and legislative branches of government. However, this agreement is 
valid for one year only and during this period should be replaced by a new 
constitution. The Ukrainian parliament is still elected on the basis of a majoritarian 
scheme with a rather weak position for political parties and a large number of 
"independent" members, mainly local SOE and kolkhoz managers. Until the recent 
constitutional agreement, it also had rights to interfere in almost everything, which is 
a typical characteristic of the traditional Soviet-type parliamentary system.
27 
Belarus also possesses such a system (together with a majoritarian election law). 
President Lukashenko is currently (April-June 1995) struggling to increase his power 
at the expense of the parliament, but the results of this conflict are very unclear so far. 
Moreover, Lukashenko seems to lack a clear vision of constitutional order in his 
country (as well as of economic reform), and this conflict actually concerns his 
personal power.  
                                              
26 Russia also received far more technical assistance from international institutions and Western 
governments than its neighbors. The inflow of foreign experts to the Ukraine really started only in the second 
half of 1994.  
27 Of course, before the partly free elections to the republican Supreme Soviets in 1990, the supremacy 
of parliament over the executive branch was purely formal. All strategic decisions were made by the Central 
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